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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
be to grant separate trials in every case where a co-defendant might
be prejudiced by the confessions, admissions or declarations of a codefendant and not leave it to conjecture or chance that he may not
be prejudiced.
BERTRAM R. BERNSTEIN.

SURVIVAL OF ACCRUED RIGHTS UPON THE CANCELLATION OF
EmPLOYMENT CONTRACTS.

It has been the rule in this state since an early date that where a
contract is terminated by the mutual consent of the parties, no claim
with respect to the rights already accrued thereunder can be enforced
unless expressly or impliedly reserved in the agreement which terminates the contract.1 Yet not until recently did the Court of Appeals
apply this rule to a case of a simple contract of hiring and service,
upon the termination of which no further relationship was contemplated by the parties.
In the case of Coletti v. Knox Hat Co., Inc., 2 decided in January
of this year, the Court of Appeals reversed an order granting a motion for summary judgment which had been affirmed by the Appellate
Division. The complaint alleged that on or about January 1, 1925,
the plaintiff and defendant had entered into an oral contract, the
terms of which were contained in a letter memorandum, which was
renewed in 1926 with slight modifications as to drawing account and
territory. The plaintiff was to be employed by the defendant in the
capacity of sales agent for a certain territory, with a drawing account
of $10,000 per year, payable bi-monthly, and traveling expenses for
the year, both to be deducted from total commissions. His commissions were to be paid at the rate of 10% of the aggregate on the first
$150,000 sales for the calendar year, and 2% on all sales beyond that
amount. A check for the balance of the total commissions for the
year was to be given him as soon after January 1, as practical.
The complaint further alleges "That the plaintiff continued in
the employ of the defendant up to on or about September 1, 1926,
pursuant to and in accordance with said agreement * * * at which
a judgment where a right conferred by law has been disregarded it weakens
the force of the law. Indeed, the reasonable fear of the court where guilt is
clearly established it is impeding the course of justice may result in decisions
which make trial judges careless, and encourage public officers and prosecuting
attorneys in the view which often obtains the approval of the unthinking, that a
guilty man, even before his guilt is established according to law, has no constitutional rights." From an address delivered by judge Lehman before the
Association of the Bar, February 27, 1930.
'McCreery v. Day, 119 N. Y. 1, 23 N. E. 198 (1890).
2252 N. Y. 468, 169 N. E. 648 (1930).
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time the employment of the plaintiff by defendant was terminated by
the consent and agreement of both plaintiff and defendant." 3 The
complaint demands judgment for $5,972.24 with interest from the
date of termination, as the amount alleged to be due for commissions
earned and unpaid at that date, based on the rates contained in the
contract. The defendant's answer substantially admits all of the
facts alleged.
The Court held that since the contract was terminated by mutual
consent, and (so far as appears in the papers) the parties did not
reserve payment of past commissions in the agreement of termination,
which agreement must govern the rights of the parties at that time,
there can be no recovery by the plaintiff in this action. The question
of whether or not any reservation has in fact been made is one for
the jury.4 Should a jury find that a contract of hiring has been
terminated by the mutual consent of the parties, and at the time of
termination nothing was said, nor was anything done to show an
intent to reserve payment for past services, the servant would be
precluded from any recovery by the doctrine enunciated in this
decision. For even to recover the reasonable value of his services, an
expressed or implied intention to consider the contract totally re5
scinded ab initio would have to be found.
The decision in this case is based on the doctrine of Lamburn v.
Cruden, 6 decided in England almost a century ago. There a servant
who was engaged at a yearly salary, payable quarterly, left his employment with the consent of his master one month after the end of a
quarter, making no arrangements for compensation for that period.
After considering the case-one in quantumnmeruit-the Court decided that the yearly rate could not be apportioned for the month,
unless the jury should find that the facts warranted an inference that
an agreement to pay for the month's labor had been made. Tindal,
Ch.J., said:
"No new contract arises, by implication of law, upon a
simple dissolution of a special contract of hiring and service,
in respect of services performed under such special contract
previously to its being dissolved."
The case was followed in England a few years later in De Bernardy
v. Harding,8 where again a mutually terminated contract for services
was under consideration. There it was held: "it was a question for
the jury, whether, under the circumstances, the original contract was
at 471, 169 N. E. at 649 (italics ours).
'Lamburn v. Cruden, 2 Man. & G. 253, S. C. 2 Scott N. R. 533 (1841).
r Supra Note 2 at 472, 169 N. E. at 649.
'Supra Note 4.
7
Ibid. at 256.
88 Exch. 822 (1853).
3Ibid.
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not abandoned, and whether there was not an implied understanding
between the parties that the plaintiff should be paid for the work
actually done as upon a quantum nwruit." 9 Leake restates the
principle thus: 10
"Where, after part execution of the consideration, the
contract is rescinded by mutual agreement, the claim for the
part executed consideration must be referred to the agreement
for rescission; and in the absence of any express stipulation,
or implied understanding upon the matter, no claim can be
made."
The New York Court of Appeals first adopted this doctrine in
McCreery v. Day," and expressly approved it in Eames Vacuum
Brake Co. v. Prosser. 12 On its facts, Coletti v. Knox Hat Co. is
distinguishable from both of these cases. In each, new agreements,
superseding and rescinding the old, provided for further acts on both
sides, and it may therefore well have been just to apply the rule. At
the time of rescission, new bases of remuneration were discussed
and agreed upon, and it is reasonable to assume that men looking to
payment for future services will have in mind those rendered in the
past. Having them in mind, it becomes their duty to indicate their
intentions concerning them. Is it just as reasonable to assume that
men terminating a contract without contemplating any future relationship, as in the instant case, must have the same state of mind, and
the same duty? We think not. Still, these cases are in turn based
on Lamburn v. Cruden, which is indistinguishable on its facts, and
hence the Court, whether justified or not in reason, at least has
authority for its decision.'"
But the soundness of applying the English rule to all contracts
of hiring and service is by no means free from doubt. In a situation
where, in fact, no intention with regard to payment for commissions
earned is present in the minds of the parties at the time of termination, it is submitted that serious injustice will follow from the application of the rule. Because at the moment a man is not thinking of
his past labors, it seems unfair that a technical rule of law should
deprive him of the fruits thereof, while the other party, equally without intention as to such payments, is allowed to benefit. Further
than this, the indiscriminate application of the rule will easily allow
an employer to indulge in sharp practice by remaining silent when
aware of the benefits he may derive from his failure to speak.
The whole doctrine of entire contracts, to which this rule applies,
is a highly technical fiction, indulged in by the courts for the avowed
9

Ibid. at 824.
" Leake on Contracts (6th Ed. 1912), 40.
" Supra Note 1.
-157 N. Y. 289, 51 N. E. 986 (1898).
Cf. Natalzzio v. Valentino, 71 N. J. L. 500, 59 Atl. 8 (1904).
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purpose of rendering true justice and safeguarding the rights of the
parties where no partial performance is within the contemplation of
the parties. But in utilizing this doctrine in contracts of hiring and
service, as in the instant case, where a daily benefit accrues to the
master, whose injury may be limited to the expense of procuring a
new servant, an injury waived by his consent to the termination of
the employment, 14 manifest injustice may result. The precise formula which is evolved from it should not be universally applied. It
is applied in Coletti v. Knox Hat Co., and we think unjustly. In
adopting the view of Professor Williston' 5 that in the case of termination of such a contract the presumption is that the parties "agree
simply to forego future performance," the Court says:
"In this view the plaintiff was discharged from the obligation of rendering further services, while the defendant was
discharged from the obligation of making further payments.
As the commissions provided for by the contract would not
have been payable until January 1, 1927, the defendant was
released from the duty of paying." 16
In Britton v. Turner,' 7 decided by the Supreme Court of New
Hampshire early in the 19th century, the Court refused to apply the
doctrine of entire contracts---"which is supposed to prevent any apportionment of the wages" "S-to engagements of hire and service,
distinguishing that class of contract from agreements to build houses,
wherein the other party might accept or reject the labor wrongly performed, or prematurely ended, the learned Judge saying:
"In fact we think the technical reasoning that the performance of the whole labor is a condition precedent and the
right to recover anything dependent upon it-that the contract
being entire there can be no apportionment-and that there
being an express contract no other can be implied, even upon

the subsequent performance of service-is not properly applicable to this species of contract, where a beneficial service
has actually been performed; for we have abundant reason to
believe, that the general understanding of the community is,
that the hired laborer shall be entitled to compensation for the
service actually performed, though he do not continue the
"Bailey v. Bourn Rubber Co., Sup. Ct. R.LI., 67 At. 427 (1907) (which
held, further, that since the damages were waived by the defendant, the master,
by his agreement to treat the contract as cancelled, the servant could recover
wages for the work already done up to the time of cancellation, i.e.,
as on a
contract terminated by mutual consent).
"3 Williston, Contracts (1920), Sec. 1827.
18 Supra Note 2 at 472, 169 N. E. at 649.
' 6 N. H. 481 (1834).
132 Parsons, Contracts (8th Ed. 1883) 40.
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entire term contracted for, and such contracts must be presumed to be made with reference to that understanding, unless
an express stipulation shows the contrary." 19
In that case the laborer had wrongfully left his employment, yet we
feel that the strong language of the Court is fully justified.
We think the better doctrine to be applied in cases of this nature,
is that even where no intent is expressed or can be implied at the time
of termination, the servant should recover pro rata at the contract
rate for services already performed under the contract. This view is
by no means unsupported by authority. Both2 text writers and decisions have upheld it. Thus, Parsons says:
"But if the contract be dissolved by mutual consent, he
(the servant) may recover wages pro rata, without any express contract to that effect."
Labatt, in his work on Master and Servant,2 1 states it to be the
American rule and, in fact, many jurisdictions have adopted it.22 In
criticizing
the New Jersey case of Freudenberger v. Sternberg and
23
Co.,

which implied approval of the English rule, Labatt says:

"But such a doctrine can scarcely be correct. The mere
fact that the amount of the commission was to be computed
at the end of the year would not, it is submitted, warrant the
inference that the parties understood that the servant, irrespective bf whether the contract should or should not have
been terminated by mutual agreement, was not to be entitled
he should continue to
to any part of his commissions, 2 unless
4
work up to the end of the year."
In some jurisdictions the courts have gone even further, 25 and
have permitted an action in quantum meruit to servants who have
" Supra Note 17 at 493.
' Supra Note 18 at 42. (The author states the proposition, but erroneously
cites Lamburn v. Cruden, supra, Note 4, as authority.)
' 2 Labatt, Master and Servant (2nd Ed. 1913), 1388.
'White v. Gray, 4 Ill. App. 228 (1879) ; Bowdish v. Briggs, 5 App. Div.
592, 39 N. Y. Supp. 371 (1896) ; Sims v. Harris, 1 Ont. L. Rep. (C. A.) 445
(1901); Hoar v. Clute, 15 Johns. 224 (1818) (where the doctrine was implied) ;
Hildebrandt v. American Fine Art Co., 109 Wisc. 171 (where the doctrine was
applied to the measure of damages, the plaintiff having been dismissed);
Perkins v. Hart, 11 Wheat. 237, 6 L. Ed. 463 (1826) (where it was stated in
general terms that indebitatits assunspsit was maintainable, if after partial
performance of a contract of employment, further execution was 'stayed by
both parties) ; Patnote v. Sanders, 41 Vt. 66, 98 Am. Dec. 564 (1868) ; Bailey
v. Bourn Rubber Co., supra Note 14.
367 N. J. L. 297, 51 Atl. 699 (1902). The New Jersey Court has expressly
approved the doctrine in the Natalzzio case, supra Note 13.
2
Supra Note 21 at 1391.
v. Turner, supra Note 17; Fenton v. Clark, 11 Vt. 557 (1839)
ZBritton
(approving Britton v. Turner); Gilman v. Hall, 11 id. 510; Byerlee v. Mendel,
39 Iowa 382 (1874) ; Ryan v. Dayton, 25 Conn. 188 (1856).
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wrongfully left their employment, on the same basic principle that
one man should not unjustly reap the benefits of another man's labor.
In allowing a recovery in quantum rieruit to an employee who had
quit because of illness, the Connecticut court, criticizing the application of the rule to an entire contract of hire, said: 26
"But this rigid and unreasonable rule has recently been
relaxed, and it is now generally, if not universally, held that
wages may in particular cases be apportioned; which, in our
judgment, is much more in accordance with the true character of such a contract, the presumed intention of the parties,
and the demands of justice."
If this is true, and we think it is, where a laborer has wrongfully left
his employment, with how much more force it applies to a contract
for services which has been amicably terminated by the consent of
the parties. It would be simple enough to determine the amount due
to the servant where he has been receiving a salary of a certain
amount at stated intervals; the mere fact that his compensation is to
be computed at varying rates of percentage for commissions, should
present no greater difficulty than a mathematical one. The principle
is the same, and equally applicable.
It is a penalty, which our law abhors, to deny payment for
labor done because of the servant's wrongful failure to complete his
term, to the unjust enrichment of the master, whose actual damages
would be far below the value of the services he has received.2 7 Surely
it is a greater penalty to deny payment to the innocent man who
leaves his employment with his master's consent, merely because he
failed, by words or acts to reserve it. The law cannot reasonably go
Ryan v. Dayton, supra Note 25 at 190.
' Parker, J., in Britton v. Turner, supra Note 17, at p. 494, lays down
an excellent set of rules, both logical and just, whereby the rights of the master
and servant alike are carefully safeguarded. He says of them:
"This rule, by binding the employer to pay the value of the services
he actually receives, and the laborer to answer in damages where he does
not complete the entire contract, will leave no temptation to the former
to drive the laborer from his services, near the close of his term, by ill
treatment, in order to escape from payment, nor to the latter to desert
his service before the stipulated time, without sufficient reason. In effect,
these rules are:
a. Where a party undertakes to pay, upon a special contract for
the performance of labor, he is not liable to be charged upon the contract
until the money is earned according to its terms; and where there is an
express contract, the law implies no new provisions except upon further
transactions.
b. Where a special contract is not performed because of the servant's
default and no money is due under the special contract and the nature
of the work is such as may be rejected by the master, who may refuse
to accept part performance, the servant cannot recover.
c. But if the master actually receives a benefit, over and above the
damage resulting from the breach, then the labor done and services
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so far as to presume a gift in that case. It need not "now interpolate a contract provision which the parties themselves neglected to
make," 28 to which the Court objects, and rightly, in Coletti v. Knox
Hat Co. The contract provision which is said to be lacking, is implicit in the mere fact of termination and, we submit, should be
presumed as a matter of law.29 This is the sounder rule, resting on
greater considerations than stare decisis-it stands the tests of both
reason and justice.
ESTHER L. KOPPELMAN.

RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF ASSIGNEES OF CONTRACTS FOR THE

SALE OF REAL PROPERTY.
In the absence of stipulations to the contrary, contracts for the
sale of real property can be assigned freely.' The extent of the
rights and obligations which an assignee takes under an assignment
has been the subject of frequent decisions in our courts. It has been
held that the assignee can enforce specific performance against the
vendor; 2 and that the vendor cannot obtain specific performance
received furnish a new consideration for a new agreement to pay the
reasonable value of the services.
d. The master may set up in defense the breach, and damages; the
implied promise being to pay over and above the cost to procure completion and the damages; but if the damages exceed the value of the
services, the plaintiff cannot recover.
e. Master may elect to recover damages in another action, but if he
elects to have them considered in this, he is deemed to concede that they
are no more than the actual value of the services performed, and he
cannot sue in another action for more."
Sufpra Note 2 at 473, 169 N. E. at 650.
'Supra Note 17 at 492, where the Court said: "But if, where a contract is
made of such a character, a party actually receives labor, or materials, and
therefore derives a benefit and advantage, over and above the damage which
has resulted from the breach of the contract by the other party, the labor
actually done, and the vahe received furnish a new consideration, and the law
thereupon raises a promise to pay to the extent of the reasonable worth of such
excess" (italics ours). This case concerned an employee who had left his
employment, but we consider the same principle applicable to the instant case,
going further, and claiming a presumption to pay at the contract rate, which
the parties determined for themselves wa* the value of the services performed.
In the states in which legislation favorable to our, view has been passed, the
tendency has been to base the amount of the recovery of the plaintiff on the
proportion of the contract completed, and not on the principles of quasi-contractual law which would enable him to recover only the reasonable value of the
services performed. For a discussion of the legislative treatment of this subject see (1930) 43 Harv. L. Rev. 647 and cases cited therein.
'Lewis v. Bollinger, 115 Misc. 221. 187 N. Y. Supp. 553 (1921); Davidson
v. Dingeldine, 295 Ill. 367, 129 N. E. 79 (1920); Epstein v. Gluckin, infra Note
2; Gerard Real Property. Sec. 1153.
2Epstein v. Gluckin, 233 N. Y. 490, 135 N. E. 861 (1922) ; Hugel v. Habel,
132 App. Div. 327 (1st Dept. 1909), 117 N. Y. Supp. 78; Midland Co. v.
Prouty, 158 Mich. 656, 123 N. IV. 549 (1909).

